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Recent Legislation
DRIVING VWHIL INTOXICATED - IMPLED
CONSENT STATUTE IN OmO
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. S 4511.19.1 (Page Supp. 1967).
The societal climate of the United States 'has for the past
several generaions fed upon cliches and epithets to such an extent
that the average citizen will utter them without thinking. Two
of the most popular (and alternately juxtaposed) are, "When you
drink, don't drive," and, "Come on, have one more for the road."
Obviously a balance must be sought between the two positions
which these statements represent in order to ensure the greatest
possible protection of the public welfare and still conform to the
prevalent mores and social habits of the citizenry.
The Ohio legislature has recently attempted to strike that
needed balance by enacting an "implied consent" statute1 which,
briefly stated, provides that any operator of a motor vehicle on the
public highways of Ohio who has been arrested on reasonable
grounds for driving while under the influence of alcohol is deemed
to have given his consent to submit to a chemical test for a deter-
mination of the alcohol content in his bloodstream- If, after a
request by police officials and a warning of the consequences upon
failure to comply with such request, the operator refuses to take
the test, his driver's license shall be revoked for a period of six
months. Significantly, under this statute license revocation is an
administrative proceeding, totally divorced from the criminal
charge of driving while under the influence of alcohol.2 Thus,
1 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19.1 (Page Supp. 1967) [hereinafter cited
as CODE). This statute, effective January 1, 1968, is representative of an increas-
ing trend in the United States to control the problem of the drinking driver through
enforcement of implied consent laws: CAL. VEHCLE CODE § 13353 (Supp. 1966);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §14-227b (Supp. 1966); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 49-352 (1967);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 321B.3 (Supp. 1965); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1001 (1964);
MiCH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2325.1 (Supp. 1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.123 (Supp.
1967); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 564.441 (Supp. 1967); NEB. REv. STAT. S 39-727.03
(1960); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 262-A:69-a (1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50.2
(Supp. 1966); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64-22-2.3 (Supp. 1967); N.Y. VMCLE AND
TRAPFFiC CODE § 1194 (Supp. 1966); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2 (Repl. Vol. 1965);
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 39-20-01 (1960); ORB. REV. STAT. § 483.634 (1965);
R.L GEN. LAWS ANN. § 31-27-2.1 (Supp. 1966); S.D. CODE § 44.0302-2 (Supp.
1960); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10 (1960); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1188
(1967); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-55.1 (Supp. 1966).
2 The procedure to be followed upon a motorist's refusal to submit to a chemical
test is distinctively administrative. Code section 4511.19.1 provides:
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mere refusal to submit to a chemical test will subject the motorist
to loss of his license, irrespective of the outcome of the criminal
(D) [No chemical test shall be given, but the registrar of motor vehicles,
upon the receipt of a sworn report of the police officer that he had reasonable
grounds to believe the arrested person had been driving ... under the influ-
ence of alcohol and that the person refused to submit to the test upon the
request of the police officer and upon the receipt of the [written form, shown
and read to the arrestee and signed by a witness] certifying that the arrested
person was advised of the consequences of his refusal, shall revoke his license
or permit to drive, or any nonresident operating privilege for a period of six
months; or if the person is a resident without a license . . . the registrar
shall deny to the person the issuance of a license . . . for a period of six
months after the date of the alleged violation....
(E) Upon revoking the license. . . or nonresident operating privilege . . .
or upon determining that the issuance of a license . . . shall be denied . . .
the registrar shall immediately notify the person in writing and upon his
request afford him an opportunity for a hearing in the same manner and
under the same conditions as is provided . . . in the cases of discretionary
suspension of licenses, except that the scope of such hearing for the purposes
of this section shall cover the issues of whether a police officer had reasonable
ground to believe the person had been driving.., while under the influence
of alcohol, whether the person was placed under arrest, and whether he
refused to submit to the test upon request of the officer, and whether he was
advised of the consequences of his refusal. The registrar shall order that
the revocation or determination that there should be a denial of issuance be
rescinded or sustained.
(F) If the revocation or . . . denial of issuance is sustained after such a
hearing, the person . . . may file a petition in the municipal court or the
county court, or in case such a person is a minor in the juvenile court, to
review the final order of revocation or denial by the registrar in the same
manner and under the same conditions as is provided . . . in the cases of
discretionary revocations and denials of drivers' licenses. Id. (emphasis
added).
A recent amendment to the criminal statute penalizing a person for driving while
under the influence of alcohol, also effective January 1, 1968, complements the implied
consent law and must be read in conjunction with it. This amendment, commonly
referred to as a presumptive statute, provides that if the analysis of a chemical test
reveals a concentration of less than fifteen hundredths of one percent by weight of
alcohol in a driver's bloodstream no presumption of intoxication shall arise but the
fact may be considered in a criminal prosecution. If the concentration, however, is fif-
teen hundredths or more, "it shall be presumed that the defendant was under the influ-
ence of alcohol." In addition, certain conditions are prescribed as prerequisites to the
conclusiveness of the presumption: the evidence of a chemical analysis is admissable
in a criminal prosecution only if the test was taken within two hours of the alleged
violation; the analysis itself must be made under prescribed methods by one possess-
ing a valid permit issued by the State Director of Health; the arrestee must be advised
that he may have his own additional test taken; and, upon his request, the completed
results of the state's chemical analysis must be made available to him. While only
a physician or registered nurse may withdraw blood, a breath test or urinalysis may
be given by anyone authorized by the state to do so. CODE § 4511.19. Note the
difference between one who may give a test and one who may analyze the test
results.
Thus, the above restrictions may be understood as limitations upon the "implied
consent" procedure which must be followed in requesting an arrested motorist to
submit to a chemical test. Police must strictly adhere to these limitations in order
to enable the registrar to make a valid license revocation under the implied consent
statute.
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proceedings before a court3 Such a double-edged sword (that is,
both criminal and administrative sanctions) provides the police
and judicial systems with a powerful instrument of control and
must have been prompted by the immediacy of the problem pre-
sented by the drinking driver.
Although statistics may at times be helpful, they need not
here be cited to support the proposition that a -motorist under the
influence of alcohol renders his automobile a dangerous instru-
mentality. The National Safety Council has for many years con-
sidered him to be one of the major problems with which the courts
and law enforcement agencies are faced,4 and the need for regula-
tion in this area should perforce be accepted without argument.
Of course, the immediate concern of the police in dealing with
this problem is to obtain evidence and proof of the motorist's
condition at the time of arrest in order to secure the maximum
number of criminal convictions.5 On the other hand, any work-
able system of regulation must balance the personal rights of
drivers against the public welfare while staving off police abuse
of the available methods for obtaining evidence.6 To strike such
a balance is not an easy task, but the authorities are well -in accord
that attempts should be built around legislation which sets forth
3 Acquittal on the criminal charge does not affect the validity of the administrative
revocation. Finocchairo v. Kelly, 11 N.Y.2d 58, 181 N..2d 427, 226 N.Y.S.2d 403,
cert. denied, 370 U.S. 912 (1962); Prucha v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 172
Neb. 415, 110 N.W.2d 75 (1961). Indeed, it has been held that a license revoca-
tion is valid under the implied consent provision even though a motorist who was
arrested for driving under the influence was never prosecuted criminally on that
charge. Bowers v. Hults, 42 Misc.2d 845, 249 N.Y.S.2d 361 (Sup. Ct. 1964). The
rationale behind the holding, that a license may be revoked either with or without a
criminal prosecution, is that the revocation is a civil proceeding the sole purpose of
which is to determine whether the petitioner acted reasonably in xefusing to submit
to the test as a prerequisite to the privilege of using the state's highways. Marbut v.
Motor Vehicle Dep't of Highway Comm'n, 194 Kan. 620, 400 P.2d 982 (1965). There
are no problems of procedure, collateral estoppel, or res judicata because of the com-
plete separation and independence of the administrative license revocation. See Got-
tschalk v. Sueppel, 258 Iowa 1173, 140 N.W.2d 866 (1966); State v. Muzzy, 124
Vt. 222, 202 A.2d 267 (1964). See generally Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 1064 (1963),
for the proposition that this is the majority position taken in the states which have
enacted implied consent statutes.
4 R. DONIGAN, CHEMICAL TESTS AND THE LAw 1 (1957). See also Penner,
Alcohol and Traffic Safety, 36 MANrrOBA BAR NEWS 75 (1967) (a report on the 4th
International Conference on Alcohol and Traffic Safety).
5 See LaPlante, Alcohol Testing: Some Recent Decisions Dealing With Implied Con-
sent Statutes, 39 CoNN. B.J. 72, 79-80 (1965); 11 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 101 (1962).
Also worthy of mention is the fact that the amount of fines which are imposed upon
motorists convicted of driving while under the influence of alcohol may substantially
increase suburban treasuries, thus providing an added incentive for the municipal
police and courts to obtain convictions.
6 Tao, Drunkenness and Criminal Law, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 530, 537 (1967).
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a maximum permissible level of alcohol in a driver's bloodstream,
as determined by chemical tests, and which provides a proper pro-
cedure for obtaining such evidence.'
Given the fact that chemical testing is a reliable source of
evidence,8 the problem for the police has been to persuade a person
arrested for driving while intoxicated to submit to the testing
procedure.' Although it has been emphasized that chemical tests
should not be the sole basis for arriving at a determination that
a driver was under the influence of alcohol,"0 the fact remains
that such evidence eases the burden on the state in its attempt to
prove a violation. Case law in Ohio under the old statute, which
provided neither for implied consent and revocation for refusal
nor for submission into evidence of chemical results and a rebut-
table presumption of being "under the influence" at a certain alco-
hol percentage evaluation," amply illustrates the tribulations of
the prosecutor. 2
7 Penner, supra note 4, at 78. Concerning the personal rights of the motorist,
the author stated the view of the Conference: 'There was almost no discussion on
this subject since in most countries . . . it would appear that they had accepted that
the personal rights of irresponsible citizens must be forfeited in relation to drinking
and driving for the protection of society." Id. (emphasis added). Mandatory sub-
mission to chemical testing, or revocation of licence in lieu thereof, falls into that
category of forfeiture. Experts, however, find little wrong with this minor infringe-
ment on personal rights; for chemical analysis is considered very valuable and test
results may provide exculpatory as well as inculpatory evidence. R. DONIGAN, supra
note 4, at 8-12; Slough & Wilson, Alcohol and the Motorist: Practical and Legal
Problems of Chemical Testing, 44 MINN. L. REv. 673, 678 (1960). In addition,
careful study and regulation of the permissible level of alcohol as an evidentiary
matter will do much to ease the degree of infringement. Cf. Forey, Symposium,
Breath Alcohol Tests, 5 TRIAL LAW GuIDm 1, 15 (1961).
8 Although prior to the passage of the recent statutes, Ohio courts were reluctant
to accept such a conclusion (see note 12 infra), the Ohio Supreme Court in July 1968,
asserted its willingness to follow the trend in other jurisdictions and held that chemical
tests provided reasonably reliable evidence for proof of intoxication. City of Wester-
ville v. Cunningham, 15 Ohio St.2d 121, 239 N.E.2d 40 (1968).
9 Comment, 51 MIcH. L. REv. 1195, 1197 (1953).
10 This is the view taken by the National Safety Council and followed almost
universally by the courts. See Slough & Wilson, Legal By-Products of Chemical
Testing for Intoxication, 11 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 1, 7 (1962). The law must depend
for the most part on behavior observations of the allegedly intoxicated motorist to
provide proof. Since these at times may be easily contradicted on cross-examination
by an alert attorney, chemical tests have been employed mainly to supplement and
substantiate the inferences drawn from the motorist's behavior. Tao, supra note 6, at
540.
11 See note 2 supra.
12 In City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Mikolajczyk, 90 Ohio L. Abs. 28, 187 N.E.2d 197
(Cuyahoga Falls Mun. Ct. 1962), the question before the court concerned the quantum
of weight to be attributed to the results of a breathalyzer test that had revealed an
alcohol percentage of 0.15 in defendant's bloodstream, which under the new law would
be sufficient to raise a rebuttable presumption of intoxication. Not only did the
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Now, however, the Ohio legislature has at last recognized the
inability of the police and the courts to cope with the problem, and
it has designated the implied consent and presumptive statutes as
the implements to aid them in the regulation of drinking drivers.
Alternatives to these types of statutes have been proposed by
several authors; 3 but these proposals, like the old Ohio law, appear
court refuse to take judicial notice of the scientific reliability of chemical testing, but
it also held that "where the results of a test conducted to determine the percentage
of alcohol in a defendant's bloodstream are not explained by a competent witness,
such results are of no probative value and should be disregarded by the trier of facts."
90 Ohio L. Abs. at 32, 187 N.E.2d at 200.
Earlier it had been held in Ohio that it was error for the court to give instructions
to the jury on the use of chemical testing devices and the manner in which they are
to be interpreted. State v. Minnix, 101 Ohio App. 33, 157 N.E.2d 572 (1956).
Furthermore, some courts were of the opinion that a certain percentage of alcohol in the
bloodstream did not prove that a motorist had been driving under the influence; and
since a court could not take judicial notice of the significance of chemical analysis,
the jury without the aid of expert testimony should not be allowed to speculate con-
cerning the inferences to be drawn from the results of such analysis. See Parton v.
Weilmay, 169 Ohio St. 145, 158 N.E.2d 719 (1959). On the other hand, progres-
sive courts in different county jurisdictions had held that the instructions by a judge
to the jury on the effects of alcohol in the bloodstream were not erroneous when it
was specifically left for the jury to determine the issue of intoxication from all the
evidence, of which the test results were only a part. State v. Titak, 75 Ohio L. Abs.
430, 144 N.E.2d 255 (Ct. App. 1955).
While lamenting the fact that Ohio, unlike many states, still had no statute creat-
ing a presumption of intoxication at 0.15 percent, the Mikolakczyk court nevertheless
felt constrained to follow the Ohio precedent which required an expert witness to
testify as to the meaning of the test results. Significantly, there existed an obvious
reluctance on the part of the court "to invade the province of the duly elected legisla-
ture." City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Mikolajczyk, 90 Ohio L. Abs. at 30, 187 N.E.2d at
198.
In the usual case, the person who conducted the test testifies as to its
manner of taking, and a second expert witness then interprets the results for
the benefit of the trier of the facts.... The presumptive statutes mentioned
above have been enacted to eliminate the necessity of calling the expert wit-
ness to interpret the tests. Id.
In one minority case, an Ohio court deemed it permissible to take judicial notice
of the results of a urinalysis test and did not require expert testimony as to the
effects of 0.40 percent of alcohol in the bloodstream. State v. Szefeyk, 91 Ohio L. Abs.
6, 191 N.E.2d 238 (Oberlin Mun. Ct. 1963). This court, however, did so expressly
because it was sitting without a jury; and it still demanded testimony and proof of
the defendant driver's behavior and condition at the time the test was taken. It is
submitted that even now, under the new Ohio statutes, the courts will similarly
require proof of behavior.
13 One such proposal has been to make written consent to take a chemical test a
condition precedent to obtaining a driver's license. Haines, Let's Impose a Limit on
Drinking and Driving, 3 CRIM. L.Q. 60, 62 (1960). Another alternative would be a
random sampling of highway drivers, much like a safety inspection check, in which
police officials would stop motorists and force them to submit to a breathalyzer analy-
sis. If the alcohol concentration were above a minimum specified level, the police
would impound the driver's automobile and merely take him home. If caught in this
manner three or more times, the driver would have his license suspended by local
officials until he came into a health center for treatment as a problem drinker. Cramp-
ton, The Drinking Driver: What Legal Controls?, 12 LAw QU AD. NoTEs 8, 10 (Univ. of
Mich., 1967).
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to be impractical and geared more toward perpetuating the prob-
lem than controlling it. Indeed, it seems that the implied consent
statute, properly employed, may itself be the best contribution to
date for protecting the public and deterring the social drinker from
driving.
14
It is, therefore, appropriate to examine not only the theory
behind such a statute but also its constitutional ramifications. The
Supreme Court has upheld the validity of the implied consent
theory, in tort situations, as nonviolative of 14th amendment due
process of law. 5 Although it is clear now, as it probably was in
1927 when Hess v. Pawloski was decided, that '"implied consent"
is really a fiction,'0 the rationale behind the theory has acquired no
disfavor in the courts and is still valid law.'7 Furthermore, aside
from constitutional questions concerning the Bill of Rights, a
strong a fortiori argument for the validity and policy of Ohio's
implied consent statute can be made by comparing it with the
circumstances of the Hess case. In this case the Court stated:'"
Motor vehicles are dangerous machines; and, even when skill-
fully and carefully operated, their use is attenuated by serious
dangers to persons and property. In the public interest the state
may make and enforce regulations reasonably calculated to pro-
mote care on the part of all, residents and non-residents alike, who
use its highways. . . . Under the statute the implied consent is
limited to proceedings growing out of accidents or collisions
[growing out of driving while allegedly under the influence of
The first of the above alternatives fails to take into account the large number of
nonresident drivers with which a state must cope. It is to be noted that Ohio's im-
plied consent law covers nonresident drivers. See Cons § 4511.19.1 (A) (D). The
second alternative above not only would necessitate a cost prohibitive in its adminis-
tration but also would never succeed in deterring the drinking driver.
14 Revocation under the implied consent statute may be viewed as a valuable alter-
native sanction when the criminal charge of driving while under the influence of
alcohol cannot be proven because of the lack of chemical analysis as evidence. See
People v. Wagonseller, 25 Misc. 2d 217, 205 N.Y.S.2d 933 (Plattsburg Mun. Ct.
1960). Moreover, the implied consent and presumptive provisions can be enforced
as a limitation upon driving habits in much the same manner as a speed limit would
be enforced. Cf. Smith, Drinking and Driving, 3 CRIM. L. Q. 65, 123 (1960).
15-ess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). The case involved a state statute
which provided that a nonresident, by acceptance of the privilege of driving on the
state highways, impliedly consented to an appointment of the state registrar to receive
service of process for him. Such a statute was said to be a valid exercise under the
police power of the state to regulate driving for the public welfare. Id. at 356.
16National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 311 F.2d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 1962);
Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm, 1963 U. ILL. LAW FoRtJM 515,540.
17 See Rosenblatt v. American Cyanamid Co., 86 S. Ct. 1, 4 (1965) (Mem.); Parrot
v. Whisler, 313 F.2d 245, 247 (6th Cir. 1963).
I8 In order to better illustrate the comparison, the writer has taken the liberty of
inserting in brackets the applicable facts of implied consent to take a chemical test.
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alcohol] on a highway in which a non-resident [or resident] may
be involved.' 9
The view that driving is a privilege - not a right - and
therefore subject to reasonable regulation under the state's police
power has long been the judicial opinion in Ohio,"0 as well as in
other jurisdictions.2" State legislation authorizing chemical tests need
only meet the constitutional requirements of due process as em-
bodied in the provisions of the 14th amendment. Moreover, to
meet these requirements it is demanded of a legislature "only that
the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capridous, and that
the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the
object sought to be attained." Guided by these standards, state
courts have consistently held implied consent statutes, similar to
the new one in Ohio, to be consonant with constitutional due
process of law."
19274 U.S. at 356. The last quoted sentence was presented as an argument for
the reasonableness and lack of discrimination in the statute itself.
2 0 See Ragland v. Wallace, 80 Ohio App. 210, 70 N.E.2d 118 (1946). This
view stems from the Supreme Court's holding in Hess. Due to Ohio's understandable
desire that only qualified drivers be permitted on its highways, any demand upon a
motor vehicle operator which is reasonable must be upheld under the inherent police
power of the state. City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Church, 10 Ohio App. 2d 9, 225 N.E.2d
274 (1967).
21 See, e.g., Escobedo v. California Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal. 2d 870, 222
P.2d 1 (1950); Dempsey v. Tyman, 143 Conn. 202, 120 A.2d 700 (1956); Gibson
v. Scheidt, 259 N.C. 339, 130 S.E.2d 679 (1963); State v. Seraphine, 226 Wis. 118,
62 N.W.2d 403 (1954). Since licensing is a privilege subject to the police power
of the state, there need be no notice to the violator or adjudicatory hearing prior to
revocation of a driver's license. Blydenburg v. David, 413 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. 1967).22 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934). Although it must be noted
that the Court was not concerned with the police power of the state to regulate driving,
the substantive due process analysis appears equally applicable to the implied consent
situation. The police power of the state to regulate pool hall licenses - a fortiori,
driver's licenses - has been upheld in Ohio under the Nebbia guidelines. Feinstein
v. City of Whitehall, 93 Ohio L Abs. 353, 198 N.E.2d 479 (C.P. 1964). The maxim
upon which the court declared state police power must ultimately rest appears parti-
cularly appropriate in judging the legislature's determination that an implied consent
statute is the proper means to deter drinking drivers: "Salus populi suprema lex."
Id. at 356, 198 N.E.2d at 481 (this writer's translation, "the welfare of the people is the
supreme law.").
23 State v. Buek, 80 Idaho 296, 328 P.2d 1065 (1958); Lee v. State, 187 Kan. 566,
358 P.2d 765 (1961); Prucha v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 172 Neb. 415, 110
N.W.2d 75 (1961); Trimm v. State, 110 N.W.2d 359 (N.D. 1961); Stenstand v.
Smith, 79 S.D. 651, 116 N.W.2d 653 (1962). Only the courts of New York,
which was the first state to enact a statute providing for implied consent to submit to
a chemical test for intoxication, have ever declared such a law unconstitutional. Sehutt
v. Macduff, 205 Misc. 2d 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Sup. Ct. 1954). But once amended
to provide for an arrest as a prerequisite to taking a test and more elaborate procedural
requirements for the administrative hearing, this statute too was upheld as constitu-
tional. Anderson v. Macduff, 208 Misc. 2d 271, 143 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
Moreover, the Supreme Court over a decade ago cited the Kansas implied consent
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However, due to the increasing trend of the Supreme Court
to incorporate provisions of the Bill of Rights into the 14th
amendment, further constitutional questions remain unanswered.
Does an implied consent statute violate the fourth amendment
right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, or the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination, or the sixth amend-
ment right to the advice of counsel? 4 Although the Court has
never passed on these issues in relation to an implied consent
statute, it may have supplied the answers in two cases which held
that blood tests given to allegedly intoxicated motorists did not
violate due process of law.25
statute with approval, although it was not passing on the issue of its validity. Breit-
haupt v. Abrams, 352 U.S. 432, 435 n.2 (1957).
24 The fourth amendment, with its attendant exclusionary rule of wrongfully ob-
tained evidence, was first made applicable to the states under the due process clause
of the 14th amendment in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Similarly, the fifth
amendment was held to govern the states in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), and
the sixth amendment in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
25 In Breithaupt v. Abrams, 352 U.S. 432 (1957), the Court reached its conclu-
sions without regard to the Bill of Rights because the fourth, fifth, and sixth amend-
ments had not yet been held to govern the states. The applicable standard at the
time, therefore, was the subjective due process determination set forth in Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952): whether the circumstances of the case "shock the
conscience of the Court" to such an extent that they must be deemed to have violated
the 14th amendment. With this as a guideline, the Breitaupt Court stated: "To be
sure, the driver here was unconscious when the blood was taken, but the absence of
conscious consent, without more [i.e., without physical coercion or medically improper
bloodtaking] does not necessarily render the taking a violation of a constitutional
right. . . ." 352 U.S. at 435 (emphasis added). In a footnote to this passage, the
Court elaborated further:
It might be a fair assumption that a driver on the highways, in obedience
to a policy of the State, would consent to have a blood test made as a part
of a sensible and civilized system protecting himself as well as other citizens
not only from the hazards of the road due to drunken driving, but also
from some use of dubious lay testimony. Id. at 435 n.2.
It was here that the Court went on to cite with approval the Kansas implied
consent statute. See note 23 supra. In a later portion of the opinion, after observing
that almost every state employed chemical tests in cases involving driving while
allegedly under the influence of alcohol, it was observed that "[t]he fact that so many
states make use of the test negatives the suggestion that there is anything offensive
[in the sense of violating due process] about them." 352 U.S. at 437 n.3. An evalua-
tion by the Court of the breathalyzer test, urinalysis, or the saliva test would probably
evoke a similar conclusion, since these are also used in almost every jurisdiction. But
despite the fact that such inverse reasoning leaves itself wide open for attack in the
circumstances of any given case, it is still doubtful that the Court will change its point
of view on chemical tests. For the second of the two cases involving blood tests,
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), not only forthrightly refused to over-
rule Breithaupt but - in passing on the issue of whether the testing was so offensive
as to violate the due process clause of the 14th amendment - also extended its
reasoning to approve the constitutionality of forcing a motorist to submit to a blood
test over his conscious objection. Id. at 760.
It should be noted here that Breithaupt - the easier of the two opinions to
accept - has been incorporated into the Ohio implied consent provision insofar as
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Schmerber v. California,28 the most recent and important of
the two, dealt specifically with privileges guaranteed under the
Bill of Rights. Although the Court found the taking of blood
for chemical analysis to be a search and seizure within the meaning
of the fourth amendment, it determined that even as such the test
was not unreasonable under the circumstances of the case. Be-
cause there was probable cause to believe that the defendant had
been driving under the influence of alcohol, and due to the neces-
sity of conducting the test immediately, no search warrant was
deemed necessary. It followed easily, then, that the "search" was
incident to a proper arrest," -and evidence in court of chemical
analysis was not precluded -by the fourth amendment.
More significant for purposes of analyzing the constitution-
ality of any implied consent statute, however, are questions arising
under the fifth and sixth amendments. In Schmerber, the Court
determined that the "evidence" taken from the defendant was
merely physical, rather than testimonial or communicative, and
hence his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination had
not been violated. 8  But the disposition from the bench was not
it states that an unconscious motorist is deemed not to have withdrawn his consent.
CODE § 4511.19.1 (B). Also, regardless of the fact that the Bill of Rights has been
partially incorporated into the 14th amendment, it actually appears that Rochin's "shock
the conscience" test - albeit sub silentio - remains with us today.
28 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
2 7Id. at 766. Due to the necessity of testing immediately the alcohol content
of a driver's bloodstream, the Court would apparently reach the same conclusion on
the fourth amendment issue in virtually every instance of a properly conducted chemical
test. Thus, the fourth amendment could not operate to defeat the constitutionality of
the implied consent statute insofar as the police request a motorist to submit to a
"search and seizure" without having first obtained a warrant. But implicit in the
Schmerber analysis is the fact that there must be an arrest before a chemical test may
be given. Therefore, it should follow that before a request to submit to testing pro-
cedures may be made under the implied consent statute a valid arrest must first
have been consummated. The Ohio legislature has so read Sckmerber and provided
for arrest as a prerequisite. CODE § 4511.19.1 (A).
28 384 U.S. at 765. This determination was made despite the fact that the Court
admitted the defendant had been compelled to submit to an attempt at discovering
evidence which would be used against him in a criminal prosecution. Id. at 761.
Such a "compulsion zone" would appear to be the proper instance in which the fourth
amendment should combine with the fifth amendment in order to form a tighter
web of personal liberty. However, one of the most recent search and seizure cases,
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), which implicitly incorporated the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination into the fourth amendment right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, has retained the distinction between
that compelled testimony which is merely physical and that which is communicative.
Since only in instances of the latter does the fourth amendment combine with the
fifth to form a constitutional "right to privacy," the holding in Schmerber that the
taking of blood (physical evidence) does not violate the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation seems to have been reinforced. The Ohio Supreme Court, being tacitly cognizant
of the fact that it may soon be confronted with such an issue under the implied con-
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quite so authoritative in its reasoning that the sixth amendment
right to counsel had not been abridged. Defendant's claim was
predicated on the fact that his objection to the test had been made
on the advice of counsel and that he 'had still been compelled to
submit to the blood extraction. Denial of the claim was accom-
plished by the Court with the utmost of logical brevity: due to the
lack of defendant's right to refuse the test under the fifth amend-
ment, there existed no asserted constitutional privilege which coun-
sel could protect.29
The Schmerber decision is currently in a precarious position.
Not only has the make-up of the Court changed significantly,"0
but several recent decisions appear to have altered the Court's
outlook on constitutional privileges. In Spevack v. Klein,"' the
Court maintained that the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination must be given a broad and liberal construction. The
case involved an administrative action against an attorney asserting
his fifth amendment constitutional privilege.3 2 Reasoning that
under the fifth amendment a person must be afforded the right
to remain silent and to suffer no penalty 'because of this silence,
sent statute, has expressed complete approval of the determination in Schmerbr
on the fifth amendment question. City of Piqua v. -inger, 15 Ohio St.2d 110, 238
N.E.2d 766 (1968); City of Westerville v. Cunningham, 15 Ohio St.2d 121, 239 N.E.2d
40 (1968).
29 384 U.S. at 766. This finding was undoubtedly based upon the rationale of
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), that the sixth amendment right to counsel
may arise under pre-trial circumstances in order to protect the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.
30 Schmerber was a closely contested 5 to 4 decision, and one of the judges who
concurred in the majority opinion, Mr. Justice Clark, has since been replaced on the
Court by Mr. Justice Marshall. Although little is known about the latter's position,
the case could be overruled if he accepts the viewpoint of the four dissenting Justices
who were particularly concerned with the majority's finding on the fifth amendment
issue.
31 385 U.S. 511 (1967). In the proceedings for disbarment a lawyer had been
asked to produce records of his financial transactions. The Court considered these to
be "testimonial" evidence which falls within the protection of the fifth amendment.
As Mr. Justice Black has dialectically illustrated, there does exist strong judicial pre-
cedent for drawing an analogy between such records and the evidence taken as the
result of a chemical test for intoxication in order to include the latter into that same
category which is protected by the privilege against self-incrimination. Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 775-77 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
32 The viewpoint of the Court on this issue had previously been expressed in Cohen
v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961), as follows: Since evidence obtained at a disbarment
proceeding could be used in a criminal prosecution, it was perfectly permissible for a
lawyer to invoke the fifth amendment. However, because the disbarment proceeding
itself was considered to be civil or administrative, utilization of that privilege would
still subject him to loss of his license to practice as an attorney. Only in the criminal
prosecution itself could an attorney attempt to assert the fifth amendment privilege
without subjecting himself to probable punition.
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the Court went far to clarify prior definitions: "In this context
'penalty' is not restricted to fine or imprisonment. It means ...
the imposition of any sanction which makes assertion of the Fifth
Amendment privilege 'costly.' ""
The relationship between the Spevack case and proceedings
under the implied consent statute is extremely dose. License rev-
ocation, like disbarment, is an administrative proceeding; and the
"evidence" which is requested under the statute, in lieu of imposing
the loss of license sanction, could be used against a motorist during
a criminal prosecution. Should the motorist refuse to take a
chemical test - which is, in effect, an attempt to invoke the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination - he will
be subject to the "costly sanction" of -losing his driving privileges."
Nevertheless, although it is not beyond the realm of possibility,35
the Court will probably never defeat an implied consent statute
through an implementation of the fifth amendment alone. In
order to do so, one of the four adamant Justices would have to
renege on his determination that the results of a chemical analysis
are physical rather than testimonial evidence. Moreover, the
Court would be reluctant to depart from the inverse reasoning in
Breithaupt v. Abrams 6 that such tests are evidentially necessary,
and the fact that so many states now have implied consent statutes
"negatives the suggestion that there is anything offensive about
them."
37
33 385 U.S. at 514-15. Thus, a lawyer could now assert the privilege against self-
incrimination and not suffer the costly sanction of being disbarred.
34 It is to be noted that the implied consent statute, similar to the holding in
Cohen, provides that while it is permissible to invoke the fifth amendment, such
action will subject a motorist to license revocation. CODE § 4511.19.1 The writer
submits that the Ohio legislature enacted the statute on the premise that a motorist
may refuse consent to take a chemical test due largely to the vulnerable grounds upon
which the majority in Schmerher decided the fifth amendment issue.
35 See notes 29 and 30 supra & accompanying test. If the Court should grant the
fifth amendment privilege for chemical testing, it undoubtedly would merely provide
a motorist with the concomitant right to the presence of counsel to insure only the
propriety of the testing. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Due to the
position it has taken on Schmerber (see note 28 supra), the Ohio Supreme Court has
recently held that Miranda is not applicable when a motorist is subjected to a chemical
test and, thus, such a motorist has no right to counsel at that time. City of Piqua v.
Hinger, 15 Ohio St. 2d 110, 238 N.E.2d 766 (1968).
Ohio's new criminal sanction statute which complements the implied consent statute,
provides that a motorist may have his own test taken; but this privilege is not made
absolute. CoDE § 4511.19. Conjecture leads one to believe that if the Court accepted
the above Miranda analogy, then that additional test would become an absolute right of
the arrested motorist.
36 352 U.S. 432 (1957). See note 25 supra.
37 See note 25 supra. For a list of the states which have enacted implied consent
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Even if the Court continues to uphold the physical-testimonial
distinction and to designate chemical analysis as physical evidence,
the more natural jurisprudential progression would be to grant
the sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel at the time
of a request to take a chemical test. Recently in United States v.
Wade8 and Gilbert v. California39 the Court held that even before
trial, in a lineup identification situation, a suspect must have the
right to counsel - despite the fact that only "physical" evidence
was being sought - in order to insure against any improper pres-
entation of the suspect by the police. Similarly, the Court could
provide that a motorist must 'have an attorney present when a
request is made to submit to a test for intoxication under an
implied consent statute, thus guarding against any impropriety on
the part of the police." Unfortunately, however, this analogy
may also fall prey to the caprice of that one concrete obstacle -
statutes, see note 1 supra. A convenient and obvious method which the Court might
readily employ to circumvent the problem would be simply to refuse a grant of certiorari
to state decisions under the statutes. See, e.g., Finocchairo v. Kelly, 11 N.Y.2d 58, 181
N.E.2d 427,226 N.Y.S.2d 403, cert. denied, 370 U.S. 912 (1962).
38 388 U.S. 218 (1967). The Court determined that while the sixth amendment right
to counsel was not advisable for fingerprinting and blood testing because of the mini-
mum risk involved, the presence of counsel was mandatory for a post-indictment line-
up, a "critical stage" in the prosecution, because of the possible prejudical or suggestive
manner in which a defendant would be presented to identification witnesses. Id. at
227-28. Although the majority determined that there was no fifth amendment privilege
attached to the physical presentation of a person at such a line-up, the same four
Justices who dissented in Scbmerber were persuaded strongly in the opposite direction
on this self-incrimination issue.
39 388 U.S. 263 (1967). While upholding the right to counsel for line-up pro-
ceedings, the Court refused to grant either a fifth amendment or a sixth amendment
privilege for the physical evidence obtained from a defendant through means of a
handwriting exemplar. Two dissenting Justices, however, were in favor of granting
the sixth amendment right to counsel when filling out an exemplar.
40 In order for the Court to do so, however, it would be necessary for them to
assert that Wlade and Gilbert have dissolved the physical-testimonial evidentiary dis-
tinction for purposes of applying constitutional privileges. This has not yet occurred.
What those two cases actually have done is to further delineate the criteria of the
distinction itself. Physical evidence has been divided into two separate categories: one
type, which possesses many easily manipulated variables (e.g., a line-up which can be
made prejudicial by police), may be referred to as alterable physical evidence, and as
such counsel's presence is necessary to prevent impropriety; the other type possesses few
currently recognized variables (e.g., blood sampling) which an attorney could watch
over, so the sixth amendment does not appear needed in these instances of unalterable
physical evidence.
Thus, the Court need not dissolve the dichotomy which it raised in Schmerber
until sufficient inroads can be made in the effort to defeat the fallacy, if any, of the
unalterable physical evidence category. It is submitted that the best approach for a
constitutional lawyer to take in an attempt to have the Court grant sixth amendment
privileges for motorists confronted with chemical testing would be to prove the exist-
ence of the amount of variables which actually may abound in the steps toward a
chemical analysis and which, therefore, can and must be protected by counsel.
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practicality. The necessity of obtaining a chemical analysis im-
mediately after arrest appears to override the necessity of procuring
an attorney and its obvious adjunct of a delay in time.41 In light
of this emergency argument, the requirement in the Ohio implied
consent law that the arrested motorist must have been advised in
writing of the consequences of -his refusal to take a test in order
for his license to be revoked could be sufficient to satisfy the
minimal fifth and sixth amendment requirements'
The interesting argument has, nevertheless, been made that
a person having consumed a large quantity of alcohol and thus
"under the influence" will be incapable of understanding an ex-
planation of the statute. Hence, due process could not be satisfied,
for the motorist would not knowingly be able to consent or refuse
to take a chemical test.43  At first glance the syllogism, based on
the premise that a constitutional prerequisite of consensual capacity
is lacking, does appear to be internally logical. But in states that
have criminal statutes, like Ohio's new "drunk-driving" statute,
which require consent to submit to a test as a prerequisite to the
admission of chemical analysis evidence into court, the argument
has been quicdy dismissed. A person may have consumed a
sufficient amount of alcohol to constitute him "under the influ-
ence" as determined by a statutory percentage and yet not be so
intoxicated that he is incapable of arriving at a rational choice.'
41This follows the reasoning of the "emergency" doctrine stated in Submerber,
in which the Court held that it was unnecessary to obtain a warrant because the re-
quired delay in doing so threatened destruction of the evidence - i.e., the alcohol
percentage begins to diminish shortly after the drinking stops. 384 U.S. at 770-71.
See text accompanying note 27 supra. In a companion case to Wade and Gilbert, the
Court also held that under an "emergency" situation there was no right to counsel at
pretrial line-up. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). An additional reason why
a motorist could be refused the right to counsel is the fact that driving while under
the influence of alcohol is only a misdemeanor.
4 2 CODE § 4511.19.1 (C). Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See also
note 35 supra. Because the advice and request must be in writing on a prescribed form,
the issue of whether a motorist was in fact requested to rake a test may never be in
issue at an administrative hearing - at least not so long as the form is submitted
into evidence. Other states have similarly upheld the right of an arrested motorist
to have the implied consent statute explained to him. See, e.g., State v. Hagen, 180
Neb. 564, 143 N.W.2d 904 (1966); Caldwell v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 277, 136
S.E.2d 798 (1964). Recent statutes in other jurisdictions have incorporated the re-
quirement of explanation. CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 13353 (Supp. 1966); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 169.123 (Supp. 1967); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 564A41 (Supp. 1967); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.1-55.1 (Supp. 1966). Indeed, the implied consent statute may be more
consonant with guarantees under the Bill of Rights, as incorporated into 14th amend-
ment due process of law, than the circuitous guidelines of Schmerber.
43 See LaPlante, Alcohol Testing: Connecticut's Implied Consent Statute, 38 CONN.
B.J. 16, 24 (1964).
441d. at 24-25. Wells v. State, 239 Ind. 415, 158 N.X.2d 256 (1959); Bowden.
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Presumably, then, Ohio's statutory scheme presents no con-
stitutional due process deficiencies relating to the ability of a
motorist to assent or dissent when faced with the implied consent
procedure. Yet, eventually, at least one additional constitutional
question will have to be answered. Consonant with the guarantees
of due process of law, will it ever be permissable under the implied
consent statute for a motorist to refuse to take a test or to request
a test different from that which is offered and still not be subjected
to license revocation? Under the Ohio statute, refusal makes revo-
cation automatic and the choice of tests to be taken is left solely to
the discretion of the police.45 Furthermore, the majority of other
state courts construing similar statutes have held that mere refusal
is grounds for revocation and the validity thereof is not affected by
failure to provide a motorist with his choice of tests.46
The efficacy of this viewpoint may be questioned in light of
the following dicta in Schmerber: "It would be a different case if
the police initiated the violence, refused to respect a reasonable
request to undergo a different form of testing, or responded to
resistance with inappropriate force."4  Later in the opinion the
Court emphasized that it was not passing on the question of
whether the police would have to respect a refusal or request to
take a different form of test reasonably based upon "grounds of
fear, concern for health, or religious scruple."4  Although these
statements wield no authority, it appears reasonable to infer from
them that there are several specific conditions (e.g., restrictions of
health or sound religious convictions) under which a motorist may
v. State, 95 Okla. Crim. 382, 246 P.2d 427 (1952); Jones v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 29,
261 S.W.2d 161, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 830 (1953). Undoubtedly, such reasoning by
the state courts begs a tepid distinction. The writer submits, however, that a motorist
who has partaken of intoxicants to such an extent that he can no longer think in a
rational manner should prima facie be deemed guilty of the criminal offense.
45 CODE § 4511.19.1 (A). The Attorney General of Ohio has stated that the arrested
person has no choice as to which type of test shall be administered since, by the clear
wording of the statute, the option must remain with law enforcement officials. 68-037
Op. Arvy GEN. (OHIo) 2-43 (1968).
46 See, e.g., Lee v. State, 187 Kan. 566, 358 P.2d 765 (1961); Timm v. State,
110 N.W.2d 359 (N.D. 1961). The courts felt compelled to arrive at this conclu-
sion not only because of the wording of the statute, but also because it would not be
economically feasible for all police stations to maintain every possible testing device
which a motorist could request. Apparently only one court has reached an opposite
determination, thus permitting the arrested driver to have his choice of tests. Ring-
wood v. State, 8 Utah 2d 287, 333 P.2d 943 (1959).
47 384 U.S. at 760 n.4 (emphasis added).
48 384 U.S. at 771. The Court also intimated that a determination of reasonable-
ness should take into consideration whether the testing personnel were authorized or
whether testing in a police station was medically abusive. id. at 771-72.
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occasionally refuse or seek his choice of tests without being sub-
ject to sanction. The fact that a due process analysis, upon
which any determination under implied consent proceedings must
be based, will always be subjective and dependent upon individual
case circumstances," provides substantial support for this conclu-
sion. In the usual case, nevertheless, the simple economic fact
that most police stations lack the facilities to provide all possible
devices will be sufficient to prevent a motorist from requesting a
different form of testing (or refusing to take a test) and then later
attempting to circumvent revocation proceedings by asserting a
violation of due process of law.51
Aside from the constitutional questions involved, each case
under the new Ohio implied consent statute will present interest-
ing questions of fact for the registrar of motor vehicles to decide.52
Since the Ohio statute requires that an officer must have reasonable
grounds to believe that a person was driving under the -influence
of alcohol before a request can be made to submit to a chemical
test, facts substantiating an officer's conclusion to that effect will
have to be included in his sworn report to the registrar. Under a
literal reading of the statute, if such facts are not included in the
officer's report, even though a motorist may have refused to take
49 In Lee v. State, 187 Kan. 566, 358 P.2d 761 (1961), the defendant had asserted
the fact that he was a diabetic as being reasonable grounds for refusal to take a blood
test. However, his revocation was sustained at the administrative hearing because he
offered no proof to support this assertion. In Donlick v. Hults, 13 App. Div. 2d
879, 215 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1961), the defendant refused to take a blood test after he had
consulted with his physician over the phone and was told by him not to submit. The
court held that his refusal constituted a violation of the implied consent statute. It
would seem, therefore, that anyone asserting a privileged refusal had best support that
claim with documentation of his physical condition.
60 See note 25 supra and the discussion therein of the "shock the conscience" test
of due process. Perhaps the police ought always to grant a motorist a reasonable
opportunity to seek his physician's advice and/or request a different test if there appear
to be valid reasons of health involved. Significantly, highranking members of the
Ohio State Medical Association have already suggested an amendment to the new
statutes which would exempt from taking the tests those persons who suffer from
heart or blood ailments, such as diabetes or hemophelia. The Cleveland Press, Feb. 17,
1968, § C, at 3, col. 2.
51 See note 46 supra. The due process argument would relate to the reasonableness
of a license revocation under an assertion that the motorist had valid grounds of
refusal.
52 Again, the scope of the administrative hearing will be limited to these issues:
(1) whether a police officer had reasonable grounds to believe the motorist was driving
under the influence of alcohol; (2) whether the person was placed under arrest; (3)
whether he refused to submit to the test upon request; and (4) whether he was
advised of the consequences of his refusal. CODE § 4511.19.1 (E). As stated earlier,
the issue presented in (4) will probably never be difficult to resolve. See note 42
supra.
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the test, the registrar may not revoke his driver's license. 3 How-
ever, since these facts will be derived from the officer's general
observations of the motorist's behavior,54 it would appear that an
officer may easily concoct facts constituting "reasonable grounds"
to put in his report. Undoubtedly a wise attorney for the motorist
will attend the administrative hearing in order to cross-examine the
officer as to his sworn statements.
The Ohio statute also demands that there be reasonable grounds
to arrest a motorist. These, of course, will be the same as the
reasonable grounds upon which the request to take a test must be
made. But the statute goes further than this. There must be an
arrest prior to such request, or refusal by the motorist will not
subject him to license revocation.5 Furthermore, the arrest must
be a valid one.56  In this respect it is important to note that the
offense of driving while intoxicated is only a misdemeanor. Hence,
according to statute, the offense itself must be committed in the
officer's presence for an arrest without a warrant to be valid.5"
Paradoxically, however, the approach which the Ohio courts have
taken has resulted in an extremely liberal construction of the
53 CODE § 4511.19.1 (A), (D), (E). An officer's report must recite facts, not mere
conclusions of law, in order for a license revocation to be valid under an implied
consent statute. Thus, the state has not fulfilled its own obligations under the statute,
and no revocation may ensue, if the police report merely asserts that "the arresting
officer had reason to believe that the defendant was driving under the influence of
alcohol." See Application of Grimshaw, 7 Misc. 2d 218, 165 N.Y.S.2d 263 (1957).
54 Examples of indicative behavior would be erratic driving, slurring of words,
staggering, and even smelling heavily of alcohol.
55 CODE § 4511.19.1 (A). See Schutt v. Macduff, 205 Misc. 42, 127 N.Y.S.2d
116 (Sup. Ct. 1954). "Arrest" should here be considered a term of art meaning the
taking into custody of another, by legal authority, for the purpose of holding or detain-
ing him to answer a criminal charge. See BLACK'S LAW DIcrIoNARY 140 (4th ed.
1951).
5 6 Schmerber demands "probable cause" to arrest, and also an arrest prior to chem-
ical testing. Thus, for purposes of the implied consent statute, there must be a "prob-
able cause arrest" prior to a request to submit to a test. See note 27 supra. Ohio's
standard of "reasonable grounds," however, must be interpreted by the state judiciary
as being a degree of persuasion identical to the Supreme Court's traditional inter-
pretation of "probable cause" if an arrest is to be held valid. Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968).
57 The exact wording of the misdemeanor statute is that the person must be "found
violating" the law. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.03 (Page Supp. 1967),
For a case construing this provision, before it was minimally revised within the past
year (to the effect that an officer must "find" a person committing a misdemeanor
in order to arrest him without a warrant), see Huth v. Woodard, 108 Ohio App. 135,
161 N.E.2d 230 (1958). In this case pursuit and arrest on mere hearsay was held
illegal. Presumably, then, if an officer were to arrive at the scene of an accident in
which an "intoxicated" motorist was involved, he should not be able to arrest the
motorist for driving under the influence of alcohol because he was not actually "found
violating" that law.
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statute. Judicial determinations are almost uniform that even
after an accident, so long as the alleged violator has admitted that
he was the operator of the vehicle involved, the police have "found"
the motorist committing a misdemeanor within the meaning of
the legislative provision, thereby rendering legal an arrest with-
out a warrant.5" Thus, the police may easily use a hindsight
approach and find reasonable grounds to believe that the misde-
meanor was committed in their presence in order to build a credible
record upon which the registrar may base a license revocation."
Again, all an attorney can do is attempt to impeach that record
through cross-examination."
Further abstract analytics disclose two additional questions of
fact. Did the motorist actually refuse to take a chemical test? If
so, at what point in time did he refuse? Although at first glance
these inquiries appear to raise moot issues, they could in some
cases aid a motorist in justifiably defeating a license revocation.
Refusal may be a matter of degree, and an administrative deter-
mination that a motorist did in fact refuse must be supported by
substantial evidence in order for a valid revocation to be accom-
plished."1 Furthermore, the time of the alleged refusal is of the
utmost importance. The new Ohio criminal sanction statute,
which proscribes driving while under the influence of alcohol, must
be read in conjunction with the implied consent statute."2 This
58In State v. Williams, 98 Ohio App. 513, 130 N.E.2d 395 (1954), the court
stated that neither the arresting officer nor any other officer must have witnessed the
defendant driving the car, and the mere fact that he had been found in a state of
intoxication was sufficient grounds upon which to arrest him for the charge of driving
under the influence. For a similar holding, see Columbus v. Glenn, 60 Ohio L. Abs.
449, 102 NXE.2d 279 (Ct. App. 1950). One court has even gone so far as to com-
pletely ignore not only the "found violating"' provision, but also the provision which
states that only in case of felonies and upon reasonable grounds may an officer later
pursue a person in order to arrest him. State v. Marshall, 61 Ohio L. Abs. 568, 105
N.E.2d 891 (Piqua Mun. Ct. 1952). The pursuit provision is found in Omo RBv.
CODE ANN. § 2935.29 (Page 1954). Hopefully, the holding in this case will never
be followed.
59 Lest all faith be lost in law enforcement officials, it should be noted that the
Supreme Court's most recent and complete pronouncement on the intricacies of prob-
able cause should negate the possibility of police subverting justice in such a manner.
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91-96 (1964). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968), and Justice Douglas' dissent therein at 35.
60 It is worthy of note that attacks on the validity of an arrest under the implied
consent statutes have been largely unsuccessful. Annor., 88 A.L.R.2d 1064, 1071
(1963).
O1 See Application of Scott, 5 App. Div. 2d 859, 171 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1958). A
motorist may be deemed to have refused in good faith if his refusal was due to the
apparent incompetency of the operator after the test had been partially administered.
Underwood v. Kelly, 5 App. Div. 2d 740, 168 N.Y.S.2d 752 (1957).
62 See note 2 supra.
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criminal provision requires that a chemical test for intoxication
must be given within two hours after the alleged violation."3
Hence, it would appear that if the request under the implied
consent statute is not made within those same two hours, a sub-
sequent refusal to submit to a chemical test would be meaningless
for purposes of license revocation.
In conclusion, it must be stated that, despite the statute's several
shortcomings and the possible policy arguments which may be
raised to oppose the legislative scheme of "implied consent," Ohio
does appear to have chosen one alternative which constitutionally
meets the problem of the drinking driver. One would do well,
nonetheless to maintain a close watch on the results produced under
the statute, for it is inevitable that questions concerning due proc-
ess requirements will always be in issue at any revocation proceed-
ing.
It has been wisely suggested by many experts that state agencies
not only certify and periodically examine the operators of chemical
testing devices in order to insure their competency, but they should
also provide for continued routine inspection of the devices them-
selves. 4 The Ohio legislature, nevertheless, has only authorized
the State Director of Health to issue permits to operators under
regulations promulgated by the Health Department. 5 Hopefully,
the latter will shore up the two immediately apparent deficiencies.
The state agencies, as well as the legislature, must always keep in
mind that an implied consent statute is neither a cure-all to the
problem of drunken driving nor an end in itself.6" The ultimate
63 CODE § 4511.19.
64 Symposium, Breath Alcohol Tests, 5 TR. L. GUIDE 1, 15 (1961).
65 OHmo REv. CODE ANN. § 3701.14.3 (Page, Current Service, 1967). The State
Health Director was expected to file his regulations and qualifications for operators
with the Ohio Secretary of State in February 1968. Unless challenged in court, these
standards were to go into effect on March 1, 1968. The Cleveland Press, Feb. 17, 1968,
§ C, at 3, col. 2. But in the meantime, many police departments had found them-
selves in an unenviable position: under the new statutes only certified personnel are
permitted to administer or request submission to the tests, but practically no police-
men had been certified. One could hardly blame them for making statements such
as, "the legislature passed the law without worrying about who was going to administer
it." The Cleveland Sun Press, Jan. 25, 1968, § A, at 4, col. 4. The police vowed that
in the interim period they would continue to give tests despite the fact that, admittedly,
lack of certification could be a good defense in court. Most law enforcement agencies
were willing to permit a judicial tribunal to decide whether a test operator's qualifica-
tions were adequate. Id.
66 It is for this reason that legislation which is oriented solely toward obtaining
more and better evidence of drunken driving or toward imposing stricter sanctions
may perpetuate rather than ameliorate the problem. Indeed, it has been opined that
the punitive approach is totally self-defeating. The social climate prevalent in the
